Within organizations, there are typically limits to leaders' authority. This paper explores how organizations are structured in the face of such constraints. Many organizational phenomena can be understood as due to leaders' desire to bolster the "legitimacy" of their authority. Examples include: above-market-clearing wages, merger decisions, bureaucratic organization, and rejection of overquali…ed workers. The concept of legitimacy is formalized in the context of a single-agent moral-hazard model. In the model, legitimacy is described as the limit to the orders workers feel they have a duty to carry out. The model develops the concept of an authority maintenance (AM) constraint.
Introduction
Within organizations, there are typically limits to leaders' authority. Leaders are usually constrained by the possibility of disobedience even in organizations where orders are generally followed. This paper explores how organizations are structured in the face of such constraints on authority.
In particular, many organizational phenomena can be understood as due to leaders' desire to bolster the "legitimacy" of their authority. Examples include: (i) above-market-clearing wages, (ii) merger decisions, (iii) bureaucratic organization, and (iv) rejection of overquali…ed workers. 2 While authority derives in part from a leader's ability and willingness to punish disobedience, it also derives from a leader's legitimacy. Legitimacy is the sense among followers that there is a duty to obey. The social psychologists French and Raven describe it as follows: "Legitimate power [of O over P] is here de…ned as that power which stems from internalized values in P which dictate that O has a legitimate right to in ‡uence P and that P has an obligation to accept this in ‡uence." 34 Legitimacy matters for two reasons. First, a sense that there is a duty to carry out orders motivates compliance. Second, it motivates followers to report on others' infractions, or to police the disobedient in other ways. Even a leader who is willing and able to punish disobedience may require legitimacy: without it, members of the organization may fail to report disobedience. The sociologist Peter Blau observes: "Coercive use of power engenders resistance...Stable organizing power requires legitimation." 5 We formalize the concept of legitimacy by introducing it into a single-agent moral-hazard model. The principal will choose (i) monetary incentives for the agent (as is standard) as well as (ii) an order to give to the agent. The agent will choose (iii) how much e¤ort to exert (as is standard) 1 Arrow (1974) , p. 75. 2 The shunning of overquali…ed workers is documented by Bewley (1999) . 3 French and Raven (1959), p. 265. 4 For further discussion of the topic of legitimacy, see Barker (1990) , Beetham (1991) , Lipset (1963) , Simmons (1979) , and Weber (1946 Weber ( ,1947 .
5 Blau (1964), p. 199-200 . The order of these two sentences has been reversed and some words have been omitted without change of meaning.
as well as (iv) whether to accept that there is a duty to follow the order given by the principal.
The idea that (iv) is a choice of the agent is in line with a large body of work on legitimacy. For example, Chester Barnard writes: "The decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the persons to whom it is addressed and does not reside in 'persons of authority' or those who issue these orders." 6 The model parameterizes the extent of the principal's legitimacy by .  represents the most demanding order the principal can give before the agent decides that there is not a duty to comply.
Initially, we assume that  is exogenous. But then we examine the case where the principal can bolster her legitimacy at a cost. The principal may …nd that cost worth incurring since this allows her to give the agent tougher orders.
In analyzing the model, we will develop the concept of an authority maintenance (AM) constraint. If the principal meets that constraint, the agent accepts that there is a duty to follow orders. In meeting the AM constraint the principal's orders incentivize the agent -giving the principal a better incentive compatibility constraint. The implications of the model for organization theory stem from the presence of the AM constraint.
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 develops the basic model and analyzes the solution to the principal's problem (both when the principal can and cannot bolster her authority.) Section 4 discusses applications and extensions of the model. It considers numerous organizational phenomena that are explained by the model. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
While the focus of this paper on legitimacy is unique, other studies have considered environments where there are limits to authority.
Persuasion. Several papers consider persuasion as a tool for inducing followers to take an action (that is, a¤ecting followers' beliefs). In these papers, the leader can potentially persuade followers at a cost that it is in their interest to take an action. In Hermalin (1998) , for instance, "leading by example" is a way of signaling to followers at a cost that they should take some action. For 6 Barnard (1938), p. 163. example, a general putting his life at risk by …ghting alongside his soldiers in battle may persuade the soldiers that it is worthwhile risking their own lives. In both Majumdar and Mukand (2004) and Prendergast and Stole (1996) , leaders are reluctant to overturn policies that they learn were mistakes, because a change of policy would signal that the leader lacks superior information or superior intellect. 78 These studies share with this paper the feature that a leader does something at a cost in order to induce compliance by followers. The key di¤erence is that, in these papers, the leader incurs a cost in order to persuade followers, whereas here the leader incurs a cost in order to bolster the legitimacy of her authority. As a result, this paper explains an entirely distinct set of phenomena.
Ability and Willingness to Punish. Several studies have considered environments in which authority is limited by leaders' ability and willingness to punish disobedience. Van Den Steen (2010) , for example, considers an environment in which a leader/…rm potentially owns all of the assets relevant for production as a way of increasing the willingness to …re followers/workers. Marino, Matsusaka, and Zabojnik (2009) argue that in cases where workers are harder to replace, a manager will have less authority, and hence it is more important to select workers whose interests are aligned with those of the …rm. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) also …ts into this strain: they assume a limited liability constraint for workers, which reduces the ability of the …rm to punish workers. They obtain, in consequence, the result that above-market wages are paid, at a cost to the …rm, so that …ring is a more severe punishment. As mentioned earlier, e¢ciency wages may arise in this paper as well. But, they will arise even when a limited liability constraint is absent (and, hence, for an entirely di¤erent reason).
These studies also …nd that costly actions may be taken by leaders to increase their authority.
But, in contrast, we assume in this paper that there are no limits on the ability or willingness of leaders to punish and hence the focus is on di¤erent issues. 7 Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp (2012) also …nd that it is valuable for a leader to be resolute. The action of their model arises, however, because followers are under-incentivized to coordinate. In their model, it makes sense for an organization to select a leader who is overly committed to executing certain goals in order to incentivize followers to coordinate.
8 Also of interest is Van Den Steen (2009) , which considers whether persuasion and authority are complements or substitutes. In his model, a principal can attempt to persuade an agent at a cost and can also increase her authority over the agent (the extent to which disobedience is punished) at a cost. Van Den Steen …nds that sometimes they are complements and sometimes they are substitutes. This result is somewhat analogous to the …nding in Section 3 of this paper that the amount of bolstering that takes place () is increasing in the principal's legitimacy (0) when 0 is low but decreasing in 0 when 0 is high.
A Model
We will formalize the concept of legitimacy by introducing it into a single-agent moral-hazard model. The principal, in addition to choosing (i) monetary incentives for the agent (as is standard), will choose (ii) an order  to give the agent. The agent, in addition to choosing (iii) how much e¤ort to exert (as is standard), will also choose (iv) whether to accept that there is a duty to follow orders.
Regarding (iv), we will assume that it is optimal for the agent to accept that there is a duty to follow orders if the order is not too tough:  · . We will refer to  as the principal's legitimacy.
We will refer to this condition ( · ) as the authority maintenance (AM) constraint for the principal.
If the principal maintains authority over the agent, we might wish to think of the principal-agent relationship as corresponding to a relationship between a leader and follower within an organization.
In particular, it might correspond to a manager and worker within a …rm. On the other hand, if authority is not maintained and the agent is incentivized purely through monetary incentives, we might wish to think of this as a market relationship. In this sense, the model may have implications for when activity will take place within …rms or within markets.
Initially, we will take the principal's legitimacy  to be exogenous. Later on, we will assume that the principal can bolster her authority:  =  0 +  where the principal chooses  (how much to bolster).
In this paper, we will not explicitly model the agent's preferences over (iv). As a result, we will not be able to provide a complete picture of why the principal's authority might be more or less legitimate, or why certain actions might serve to bolster the principal's authority. While it would be nice to be able to provide a complete characterization of the agent's preferences over (iv), doing so would (a) be a distraction from the main focus of the paper, and (b) seems to be separable from the questions addressed in this paper. In other work, however, I have attempted to develop a deeper understanding of how an agent forms preferences over (iv) (see Akerlof (2010) ).
We will proceed as follows. Section 3.1 elaborates the setup of the model. Section 3.2 gives the solution to the principal's problem when  is …xed. Section 3.3 gives the solution to the principal's problem when the principal can bolster her authority. Section 3.4 discusses an alternative way of interpreting the model besides the main one o¤ered.
The Setup
The principal observes a measure of output  which can be high or low ( 2 f g). The probability that measured output is high is increasing in the agent's e¤ort at two tasks: Pr( = ) =  1 +  2 where  1 and  2 denote the agent's e¤ort at tasks 1 and 2 respectively and   0. 910 We assume that the principal has two tools for incentivizing the agent. First, the principal pays a wage () based upon measured output. Second, the principal gives an order  as to how much e¤ort the agent should exert at task 1.
The principal is risk-neutral and, while the measure of output  depends upon e¤ort at both tasks, actual output depends only upon the agent's e¤ort at task 1, so that pro…ts are:  =  1 ¡().
We will see that paying the agent for high measured output (for  = ) has the problem that it incentivizes the agent to exert e¤ort not only at task 1 but also at task 2, which the principal does not care about. To give a concrete example, imagine the principal owns a company. Task 1 might be activities that improve the pro…tability of the company and task 2 might be accounting manipulations that make the company look more pro…table than it is. Paying a bonus for high measured pro…tability (for  = ) in this setting incentivizes the agent to spend part of her time engaging in accounting manipulations. 11 Monetary incentives are less e¤ective as a tool for incentivizing the agent when  is greater, since a higher  means that  is a worse measure of e¤ort at task 1.
The timing of events is as follows:
Time 1: The principal o¤ers a wage ().
Time 2: The agent decides whether to accept the o¤er or take an outside option which gives her utility ¹  .
Time 3: The principal gives an order .
9 We assume a multi-task moral hazard setting as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) . 1 0 The solution to the model never puts Pr( = )  1. 1 1 Oyer (1998) documents one such context. Salespeople get a bonus if their sales exceed an annual quota. In consequence, they "pull in" business from next year of "push out" business until the following year depending upon whether they expect to be below or above the quota. While the model developed here assumes task 2 e¤ort has no e¤ect on the principal's pro…t, this is done largely for simplicity. The ideas of the paper are applicable in contexts where task 2 e¤ort has both positive and negative e¤ects on pro…t.
Time 4: The agent has another opportunity to take her outside option. 12 Time 5: The agent decides whether to accept that there is a duty to follow orders, and chooses e¤ort at tasks 1 and 2.
Time 6:  is realized and the wage is paid.
Later on, we will consider the possibility that, at time 0, the principal can choose to bolster her authority at a cost ().
The agent's problem
When the authority maintenance (AM) constraint ( · ) holds, it is optimal for the agent to accept that there is a duty to follow orders. We assume that when the AM constraint holds and the agent (as is optimal) accepts that there is a duty to follow orders, her utility is given by:
The agent's utility is increasing in the wage  received. The second and third terms re ‡ect the cost associated with exerting e¤ort at tasks 1 and 2 respectively. Having accepted the principal's authority (and hence that she has a duty to follow orders), the agent loses ( 1  ) from failing to follow orders.
For simplicity, we will assume that (
when the principal has authority over the agent, the agent will follow the order exactly ( 1 = ).
This assumption will simplify the analysis but is not crucial: all that really matters is that the agent loses utility from disobeying the order.
The agent's expected utility is:
where the …rst term of this expression is the agent's expected wage.
The agent …nds it optimal to choose:
We will refer to this as   (the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent when the authority maintenance constraint holds).
We observe from   that, when the principal maintains authority, paying a bonus for  =  (setting () ¡ ()  0) does not a¤ect e¤ort at task 1. It only leads to more e¤ort at task 2 (the unproductive task). As a result, we will end up …nding that, in instances where the principal chooses to maintain authority, she will choose not to pay a bonus.
The agent's participation constraint is:
Since the agent always chooses  1 = , in which case ( 1  ) = 0, we can write the participation constraint alternatively as:
We will refer to this as    .
Let us consider now what happens when the AM constraint does not hold and the agent (as is optimal) rejects that there is a duty to follow orders. We assume her utility is given by:
The only di¤erence is that ( 1  ) is absent, re ‡ecting that there is no sense of duty to follow orders in this case.
This yields the following incentive compatibility constraint for the agent:
We will refer to this constraint as   .
From   we see that as  increases, we get more task 2 e¤ort relative to task 1 e¤ort.
The reason is that, as  increases,  becomes a worse measure of task 1 e¤ort.
The participation constraint for the agent is:
Observe that    and    are identical. Hence, in the future we will simply write   to refer to both participation constraints.
In fact, the model was constructed so that the participation constraints would be the same.
We might imagine settings where the agent derives utility -positive or negative -from being a follower and accepting authority. In assuming    =    , we eliminate this e¤ect so that we can focus on the role authority plays as a tool for incentivizing agents. 13
The principal's problem
The principal's pro…ts are given by:
Hence, the expected pro…ts of the principal are:
where the second term is the agent's expected wage.
The principal's problem can be stated as follows:
We see that, if the principal meets the AM constraint, the principal faces a better incentive compatibility constraint (…nds it easier to incentivize the agent since the principal can give the agent an order). The principal must decide whether to meet the AM constraint, which is costly if legitimacy  is low, in order to obtain a better  constraint.
Solution to the principal's problem
We will now characterize the solution to the principal's problem as a function of the principal's legitimacy (). This will serve as a baseline for comparison to the case where the principal can bolster her authority. We …nd that there are three regions. When  is large, the principal has "unlimited authority" and can give an order which achieves the …rst-best outcome. The AM constraint is nonbinding in this case. The principal pays a …xed wage since paying the agent a bonus when  is high simply serves to increase e¤ort at task 2 ( 2 ), which is not desired. 14 Note that there is a limit on how much e¤ort the principal orders the agent to exert ( = 1) since the principal must compensate the agent for her e¤ort exertion (because of the participation constraint).
When the principal has a bit less authority ( ¹     ¸¹   ), the principal …nds her authority worth maintaining, but is unable to achieve the …rst-best. The AM constraint is binding in this region. The principal pays a …xed wage as she does when she has unlimited authority. Again, the reason is that paying a bonus increases task 2 e¤ort without a¤ecting task 1 e¤ort.
Finally, when the principal has very little authority ( ¹    ), the principal chooses to give it up and use monetary incentives exclusively. We might wish to think of this as a market relationship.
In this region, the authority maintenance (AM) constraint is violated. The principal now does pay a bonus.
The following proposition states this more precisely:
The solution to the principal's problem is as follows.
(1) Unlimited Authority Region (¸¹   )
The principal chooses:
The agent chooses:  1 = 1 and  2 = 0.
The principal's pro…ts are:
The agent chooses:  1 =  and  2 = 0.
The principal chooses:  which violates AM (no order given)
The agent chooses:
Proposition 2 characterizes the cuto¤ points de…ning the three regions, ¹    and ¹   .
Proposition 2 The values of ¹    and ¹   (the cuto¤ points for the regions) are:
The value of ¹   is decreasing in :
Proposition 2 shows that the no authority region in which monetary incentives are used becomes smaller as  increases (
The reason for this …nding is that, as  increases,  becomes a worse measure of task 1 e¤ort, so the principal is more inclined to hold on to authority.
Bolstering Authority
We turn now to the most interesting case, in which the principal can bolster her authority.
We assume that the principal's legitimacy  depends upon how much the principal bolsters her authority:  =  0 +  where  0 is given and ¸0 is how much the principal chooses to bolster.
We assume  is chosen at time 1 when the wage o¤er () is made.
The principal bolsters her authority at a cost (), so that her pro…ts are given by:
where the cost of bolstering is convex:  0   00¸0 .
We will consider what the solution to the principal's problem looks like depending upon the extent of the principal's legitimacy ( 0 ).
Solution to the principal's problem with bolstering
The solution to the principal's problem depends upon the legitimacy of the principal's authority ( 0 ). We …nd that there are four regions. The …rst region is an "unlimited authority" region ( 0¸¹    ). In this region, the principal has su¢cient legitimacy to order the agent to exert the …rst-best level of e¤ort without bolstering authority at all ( = 0). AM is nonbinding in this region. The principal pays the agent a …xed wage. As before, we …nd that the principal pays a …xed wage unless she gives up her authority (AM is violated).
A second region is a "limited authority/no bolstering" region. In this region, the principal does not have su¢cient authority to order the agent to exert the …rst-best level of e¤ort without bolstering. Rather than bolster authority in order to give a tougher order, though, she chooses not to bolster ( = 0) and orders less than the …rst-best level of e¤ort. AM is binding in this region.
A third region is a "limited authority/bolstering" region. In this region, the principal's legitimacy is now low enough that it makes sense to bolster authority (  0.) The principal …nds it worthwhile to bolster authority so that she can give a tougher order to the agent. This is the case of greatest interest because it shows that limited authority on the part of the principal may lead her to take costly bolstering actions. AM is binding in this region and the …rst-best is not achieved.
The fourth region is a region in which the principal has very little legitimacy and hence chooses to eschew the use of authority and establish what we might wish to call a market relationship with the agent. AM is violated in this region and a bonus is paid when  = . The agent is not motivated by the principal's order in this region-only by the desire to obtain a high wage.
The following proposition characterizes these regions.
Proposition 3 The solution to the principal's problem when it is possible to bolster authority is as follows.
(1) Unlimited Authority Region ( 0¸¹    )
The principal chooses:  and  which solve the following two equations:
Bolstering increases as legitimacy falls:
The principal chooses:  which violates AM (no order is given),  = 0
2 ) 2 (which is  0 for   1 and  0 for   1)
The following proposition characterizes the cuto¤ points for the four regions ( ¹    , ¹   , and
Proposition 4 The following is a characterization of the cuto¤ points de…ning the four the regions
, an implication of which is that region (3) exists if  0 (0) is su¢ciently low.
Proposition 4 shows that, while a bolstering region need not exist, it will exist if  0 (0) is su¢ciently low. That is, if a little bit of bolstering can be done cheaply, a region will exist where bolstering occurs. Proposition 4 also shows that, as in the previous case without bolstering, the size of the no authority region becomes smaller as  increases. The reason is the same as before:
monetary incentives work less well because  is a worse measure of output.
An Alternative Interpretation of the Model
In the introduction, we suggested that there are two reasons that legitimacy matters. A sense that there is a duty to carry out orders (i) motivates compliance, and (ii) motivates people to report on others' infractions or police the disobedient in other ways.
The model we have developed seems to be exclusively about (i). In this section, we will show that the model can be interpreted as being either about (i) or about (ii). We will suggest a di¤erent interpretation of the model in which only (ii) is at work.
Suppose, as before, that the principal only observes  (the noisy measure of output) but the agent has coworkers who observe  1 . Let us suppose, in contrast to before, that the agent does not feel a sense of duty to follow orders. However, the coworkers feel the agent has a duty to follow orders when the AM constraint holds. When AM holds, the coworkers get angry when the agent fails to follow orders and notify the principal if  1 6 = , allowing the principal to in ‡ict a punishment . 15 The agent's utility when AM holds thus changes to the following:
The ( 1  ) term is absent since the agent does not feel a sense of duty to follow orders but the term  ¤ 1f 1 6 = g is present re ‡ecting that the principal in ‡icts a punishment  whenever  1 6 = .
To be a bit more concrete, consider the timing that corresponds to this alternative interpretation:
Time 1: The principal chooses how much to bolster authority , and makes an o¤er to the agent of a wage () and a punishment  in the event that coworkers report orders were disobeyed ( 1 6 = ).
Time 4: The agent has another opportunity to take her outside option.
Time 5: The agent chooses e¤ort at tasks 1 and 2.
Time 6: Coworkers observe the agent's e¤ort  1 . If they accept that the principal has authority over the agent, which they do if AM holds, they will report if orders were disobeyed ( 1 6 = ).
Time 7:  is realized, the wage () is paid, punishment  is in ‡icted if the coworkers reported disobedience.
Observe that it is clearly optimal for the principal to set  = 1. As a result, ¤1f 1 6 = g = 0 if orders are obeyed and 1 otherwise. Hence, ¤1f 1 6 = g = ( 1  ). As a result,   ¡ =   and the solution to the principal's and agent's problems will be exactly the same as before.
Applications and Extensions of the Model
In this section, we will consider various applications and extensions of the model developed in Section 3. This section endeavors to show organizational phenomena can be explained by leaders' concern about the legitimacy of their authority. We will give explanations for: (i) abovemarket-clearing wages, (ii) merger decisions, (iii) bureaucratic organization, and (iv) rejection of overquali…ed workers.
Fair Wages
It may be important for a manager to treat workers in a manner they consider to be fair in order to maintain legitimacy. Typically, the wages workers consider to be fair are greater than their outside option-the market wage. Hence, paying an above-market wage may be one way of bolstering authority.
We might model this as follows:
That is, the principal bolsters authority by giving the agent more than her outside option (  ¹  ). If the principal chooses   0, this means that the participation constraint is nonbinding and an above-market wage is paid to the agent.
While this case does not initially look like the model with bolstering analyzed in Section 3.3, with some translation, it can be shown to be the same. Rather than thinking of the principal as choosing (  ()) to maximize pro…ts, suppose we instead think of the principal as choosing ( ()) to maximize pro…ts where() = () ¡ ( ¡ ¹  ). If the principal's problem is stated in this way, it is equivalent to the principal's problem from section 3 with () =   and() substituted for (). This leads to the following corollary of Proposition 3.
Corollary 1 Consider the case where the principal's legitimacy is given by:  =  0 +  where
. In this case, the solution to the principal's problem is as follows:
This region will exist if  is su¢ciently large.   is nonbinding in this region.
The proposition shows that, if paying an above-market wage has a substantial e¤ect on legitimacy ( is su¢ciently large), there will be a region in which the principal will choose to bolster authority by paying an above-market wage. The participation constraint will be non-binding in this region.
As mentioned earlier, above-market wages arise in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for a very di¤erent
reason. In their model, the optimality of e¢ciency wages relies upon a limited liability assumption:
()¸0 for all . Above-market wages arise here even without the assumption of limited liability.
Another reason for above-market wages is reciprocity: in these models, a manager gives a worker an above-market wage and the worker reciprocates by putting in more e¤ort. 16 The reciprocity story is closer to the one told here, but there are three things which distinguish it. First, the reciprocity may be of a more complex type than has typically been assumed: the worker may reciprocate by being more willing to do what the manager tells her to do rather than by putting in more e¤ort all of the time. Second (and perhaps more importantly), when a worker is well paid, coworkers are more likely to feel that it is inappropriate for that worker to be disobedient and shirk.
The coworkers are more likely to report misbehavior to the manager or bring the worker into line themselves. This follows from the interpretation of the model given in Section 3.4. Finally, the manager is fully informed about how workers are behaving, which di¤ers from other moral hazard models where managers are in the dark. If a worker disobey orders, this gets reported to the manager. Workers do not behave as the manager would ideally like when the manager has limited legitimacy, but the manager will nonetheless be fully informed as to how workers are behaving.
Merging …rms with di¤erent cultures
The model says something about when activity will take place in a market and when activity will take place within a …rm.
To illustrate, let us suppose there are two agents over whom the principal might have authority rather than just one. We might wish to think of a case where the principal maintains authority over both as a case where they form a single …rm. In contrast, we might wish to think of a case where the principal maintains authority over just one and has a market relationship with the other as corresponding to a case where there are two …rms.
Suppose the legitimacy of the principal's authority over agent A is   +  and the legitimacy of the principal's authority over agent B is   + , where bolstering is costless (() = 0).
In the event that   0, we can think of agents A and B as coming from similar cultures in the following sense: what the principal needs to do to establish authority over agent A is the same as what the principal needs to do to establish authority over agent B ( should be large for both).
Since it is assumed that () = 0, it is clear what the solution to the principal's problem looks like:
she will bolster authority over both agents at zero cost, order them to take the …rst-best action (  =   = 1), and pay them both a …xed wage.
So, the model implies that when agents come from similar cultures, it makes sense for them to be merged into a single …rm. To illustrate what happens, let us consider the case where  = ¡1. The solution to the principal's problem will depend upon the aggregate level of legitimacy (  +   ). When her legitimacy is su¢ciently high, she will be able to maintain authority over both agents and give them the …rst-best orders despite the cultural di¤erence. Both AM constraints will be non-binding in this case. When she has an intermediate amount of legitimacy, she will maintain authority over both but neither will be given the …rst-best order. In this case, she struggles to maintain authority over both A and B, but …nds it worthwhile to do so. When her authority is su¢ciently weak, she will …nd it best to establish a market relationship with one of the agents (violate AM) so that she can give the …rst-best order to the other agent. We can think of this …nal case as one where the di¤erence in culture between agents A and B is su¢ciently great that it does not make sense for them to operate as a single …rm.
Proposition 5 states the result more precisely.
Proposition 5 Suppose  =   +,  =   ¡, the principal can choose any  2 R, and bolstering is costless (() = 0). The solution to the principal's problem is as follows
(1) Unlimited Authority Over Both Regions (
The agents choose:
The agents chooses:
The principal either chooses ¸1 ¡   and maintains authority over just agent A or chooses  ·   ¡ 1 and maintains authority over just agent B. If the principal maintains authority over just agent A, the solution is as follows:
The principal chooses   which violates AM for agent B (no order given)
Agent B chooses:
The solution looks identical in the case where the principal maintains authority over just agent B. Buono, Bowditch, and Lewis (1985) describe a case where these issues are at play. They examine a 1981 merger of two mutual savings banks of similar size. While the banks were in many ways similar, di¤erent cultures prevailed. In particular, the leadership style in Bank A was somewhat democratic and participative while the leadership style in Bank B was more authoritarian.
According to Buono et al., both banks took pride in their cultures and, in each bank, the style of leadership prevailing prior to the merger was viewed favorably by employees. Bank A prided itself on being a place where people were kind whereas Bank B took pride in being "lean and mean."
The merger was a mutual decision of the CEOs of the two banks. Following the merger, the CEO of Bank A became the CEO of the merged bank and the CEO of Bank B became the COO.
Despite this, it was actually the CEO of Bank B who played the key role in managing the merged bank while the CEO of Bank A was largely focused on external industry and environmental issues.
It appears from Buono et al.'s analysis that the Bank B CEO had considerably less legitimacy within Bank A than the Bank A CEO had had prior to the merger. They …nd that there was considerable anger in Bank A post-merger and resistance to the authority of the Bank B CEO.
Bank A had the impression that the Bank B CEO was attempting to impose a more authoritarian leadership style.
Bureaucracy
The model of limited authority we have developed allows us to formalize a theory of bureaucracy developed by Alvin Gouldner (1954) and also suggests another more original theory of bureaucracy. 17 Gouldner's theory was recognized by March and Simon (1958) , but it has received relatively little attention since -most likely because a formal model has been lacking.
While it is hard to give a precise de…nition of bureaucracy, bureaucracy seems to refer to situations where rules are set, decisions are made, or orders are given that are not fully tailored to the situation at hand, ignore relevant information or, in the case of Prendergast's (2007) theory, are based on a somewhat biased reading of the information. Perhaps the reason people …nd bureaucracy so frustrating is the sense that information is being ignored or mishandled. Gouldner's theory and the other theory proposed in this section certainly accord with this de…nition.
Gouldner's Theory
Alvin Gouldner's theory of bureaucracy derives from his 1954 study of the General Gypsum Company and its Oscar Center plant. The company's main o¢ce had recently appointed Vincent Peele to replace the longtime plant manager, with a charge of making reforms. The plant workers were wary about Peele as a newcomer looking to shake things up. Gouldner observed that Peele adhered dogmatically to rules set by the central o¢ce. He writes that "[appeals to the rules] help make [Peele's] behavior more palatable to the plant. When Peele did something which he knew the workers would not like, he often justi…ed it as due to main o¢ce requirements." 18 Although Peele's strict adherence to the letter of the main-o¢ce rules upsets the workers, Gouldner gives a reason for such "bureaucracy." With his low level of authority over the workers, Peele needed to rely on the authority of the main o¢ce.
We can formalize Gouldner's idea with a slightly amended version of the model without bolstering from Section 3.1. Suppose there is one agent but two principals (A and B), each of whom could potentially incentivize the agent. Principal A and principal B divide pro…ts equally between them so they agree that whichever of them can generate the greater expected pro…t should be the one to incentivize the agent. Principal A, with legitimacy   , will correspond to the main o¢ce in Gouldner's example and principal B, with legitimacy      will correspond to Vincent Peele.
While principal A has greater legitimacy than principal B, principal B has superior information.
We suppose there are two states of the world  2 f¡1 1g with Pr( = 1) =   1 2 . Principal B, corresponding to Peele, knows the state of the world while principal A does not.
In order to give a context in which information has value, we need to make a few further amendments. We will assume that the agent's e¤ort at task 1 ( 1 ) can take on positive or negative values and that Pr( = ) = j 1 j +  2 . Recall that the cost to the agent of exerting e¤ort at task 1 is 1 2  2 1 , so that the agent faces the same e¤ort cost if she chooses
While the agent is equally willing to choose  1 =  or ¡, we assume the principal is not indi¤erent due to the following change to the principal's pro…t function. Rather than assuming as we did before that  =  1 ¡ (), we will now assume that  =  1 ¡ (). The principal prefers that the agent choose  1 =  when  = 1 and  1 = ¡ when  = ¡1.
Consider the case where both principals have an intermediate amount of legitimacy, so that the AM constraints for both will be binding. Principal A, who is uninformed, will give an order to the agent of   =   (this is the optimal order since Pr( = 1) =   1 2 ). Principal B, who is informed, will give an order to the agent of
Their expected pro…ts will be as follows:
Potentially principal B can generate a greater pro…t than principal A because of her superior information. B's pro…ts will be higher relative to A's when  is low: a low value of  means that  = ¡1 occurs relatively frequently and hence principal B's information is somewhat valuable. But, it is also possible that principal A will be able to generate a greater pro…t due to the greater legitimacy of her authority (     ). Principal A will not give orders that are as well tailored to the situation (  does not depend upon ) but she may be able to make up for this by getting the agent to exert more e¤ort. Hence, there is a rationale in the Gypsum plant for a strict reliance on rules set by the main o¢ce despite the fact that those rules may frequently deviate from what both Peele and the workers think would be best.
Another theory of bureaucracy
The model of legitimacy developed in Section 3 suggests another theory of bureaucracy besides
Gouldner's. To illustrate the idea, suppose a manager faces a choice between setting a clear rule (such as "always arrive at work by 8am") and one which is more complicated (such as "always arrive at work by 8am unless x, y, or z has happened"). The complicated rule may be more e¢cient since it can be tailored to the circumstance. But there seems to be a reason for choosing a clearer, more bureaucratic rule: it is probably easier to achieve compliance when the rule is simple.
In order to capture this idea, consider the same setting as before where  2 f¡1 1g and
We will suppose there is just a single principal this time. The principal does not know the state , but the agent does know the state. Furthermore, we allow the principal to give state-contingent orders to the agent: (). In other words, the principal can give an order to do (1) when  = 1 and (¡1) when  = ¡1.
Clearly, there is a value in giving orders that are tailored to the state ((¡1) 6 =  (1)). However, we assume that giving a more complicated, tailored order reduces the principal's legitimacy. If a simple order is given ((¡1) = (1)), the AM constraint is
First, consider the optimal simple order to give. If   takes an intermediate value, so that AM is binding, the optimal order is () =   . If   takes an intermediate value, the optimal complicated order to give will be () =   . Let us compare the principal's expected pro…ts.
The principal's expected pro…ts from giving a simple, bureaucratic order are:
The principal's expected pro…ts from giving a tailored, non-bureaucratic order are:
It makes sense to be bureaucratic (     ) if (i) it has a large e¤ect on legitimacy (  is su¢ciently large relative to   ) and (ii) the bene…t of having tailored orders is relatively low ( is large enough that  = ¡1 only rarely).
Why might the principal's legitimacy depend upon the complexity of the order given? One rationale derives from the interpretation of the model given in Section 3.4. While a worker might know a state of the world , her coworkers might not. As a result, it might be di¢cult for coworkers to determine whether a worker is following a complex state-contingent order or not. If it is di¢cult for the coworkers to tell whether orders are being followed, they will not be able to report disobedience to the principal. In contrast, when a simple order is given ("always arrive at work by 8am") it is easy for coworkers to determine whether it has been obeyed. Bewley (1999) has observed that …rms typically dislike hiring workers who seem "overquali…ed" for a job. In interviews Bewley conducted with personnel managers, he has documented their reasoning. One personnel manager said the following: "Overquali…cation is a problem, just as is underquali…cation. You cannot ful…ll the needs of an overquali…ed person. They will be unhappy and will be a problem." 19 It would seem that a large part of what is going on is that it is di¢cult to manage such workers (AM is tight). Let us make a very small amendment to the model from Section 3 without bolstering to formalize what seems to be going on. 20 Instead of assuming the principal's pro…ts are given by
Failing to Hire Overquali…ed Workers
where  is assumed to be higher for a more quali…ed agent. We will also assume that the principal's legitimacy depends upon how quali…ed the agent is (), with  decreasing in  to re ‡ect the idea that it might be di¢cult to maintain authority over more quali…ed agents. 21 With the assumption that () takes an intermediate value, so that the AM constraint is binding, the principal's expected pro…ts will be:
where constant, () would be increasing in  due to the fact that more quali…ed workers are more productive. But, since legitimacy falls as  increases, pro…ts may actually fall as  increases. It is indeed possible, as the personnel manager states, that both overquali…cation and underquali…cation pose a problem.
There is another problem with hiring overquali…ed workers, though, which may be even more important. Workers who are di¢cult to manage and fail to respect authority have a bad attitude which may be infectious. Teachers, similarly, always worry when one student is determined to play the role of class clown. They know that, if they are not careful, other students will join the class clown in her tomfoolery.
1 9 Bewley (1999), p. 284. 2 0 An alternative story would be that, in applying for a job for which one seems to be overquali…ed, one signals some other kind of defect. While this story may explain part of what is going on, there seem to be instances where this signaling e¤ect is absent. Consider, for example, an economy in recession in which many highly quali…ed workers get laid o¤. One would imagine that it would not be an especially negative signal about oneself to apply for a job for which one is overquali…ed in such an economy. However, at least anecdotally, highly quali…ed workers who get laid o¤ in recessions …nd it di¢cult to …nd new jobs and frequently get told that they are overquali…ed.
2 1 Perhaps a key reason why legitimacy might be lower is as follows. An overquali…ed worker …nds it di¢cult, threatening to her self esteem, to imagine that with all of her experience she is just supposed to be a servile and unquestioning follower of a manager. In questioning orders, she is engaging in a process to protect her self esteem.
There is a case analogous to an overquali…ed worker in the classroom. Consider individuals who, after working for a period of time or raising a family, return to school to obtain a degree. These individuals, somewhat older than other students, often feel that they should know things that the other students do not know and often have a desire to assert equality with the professor. It is common for such students to speak up frequently in class and question the assertions of the professor. A professor may …nd it di¢cult to deal with such a student.
We might capture this second e¤ect as follows. Suppose there are two agents: A and B. The principal's authority over agent A may depend upon both   and   :   (     ). Similarly, the principal's authority over agent B may depend upon both   and   :   (     ). In this event, in choosing to hire an overquali…ed worker A, a manager needs to think not only about whether worker A will be di¢cult to manage but also about how this will a¤ect her ability to manage B.
Conclusion
This paper has argued that limited legitimacy of authority plays a signi…cant role in determining organizational behavior and organizational structure. We formalized the concept of legitimacy in a single-agent moral hazard model. The model explains numerous organizational phenomena: above-market-clearing wages, merger decisions, bureaucratic organization, and the rejection of overquali…ed workers.
The paper suggests many topics for further research. The …rst is exploration of further applications and extensions of the model for organization theory and political economy.
Second, this paper has considered environments where decreases in legitimacy reduce welfare.
Another avenue for future research would be to explore reasons why low legitimacy might be bene…-cial. For example, it might prevent abuse of authority or allow for better information aggregation. 22 Finally, developing a more complete understanding of what confers legitimacy is an important topic for future study. 23 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. There are three cases to consider: (1) AM holds and is non-binding, (2) AM holds and is binding, and (3) AM does not hold. The PC and IC constraint will always be binding. We will consider each in turn. Each corresponds to one of the three regions.
Case (1): The principal's expected pro…ts are () =  1 ¡ [() + ( 1 +  2 )(() ¡ ())]. In this case, it is clear that it is optimal to set () ¡ () = 0 since () ¡ ()  0 increases  2 without increasing  1 . A higher  2 is a pure cost for the principal since it is unproductive and, through the participation constraint, means paying the agent more to compensate the agent for additional e¤ort exertion. If we assume that () ¡ () = 0, and substitute in IC-AM and PC to the pro…t function, we obtain: () =  ¡ for agent A, (2) AM is binding for agent A, and (3) AM is violated for agent A. Let us consider each case in turn.
Case (1): If AM is non-binding for agent A, it must be the case that AM is non-binding for agent B. Suppose not: then the principal should have chosen a lower value of  which serves to tighten the AM constraint on agent A (which has no e¤ect on pro…ts since AM is non-binding) and serves to loosen the AM constraint on agent B (which increases pro…ts since AM is binding). Hence, Case (1) arises if and only if there exists a  for which both AM constraints are non-binding (or,   +   1 and   ¡   1). Hence, case (1) occurs when   +    2. Since both AM constraints are non-binding, the solution is given by case (1) of Proposition 1.
Case (2): by the argument just given, if AM is binding for agent A, AM must also be binding for agent B. Hence, the solution is given by case (2) of Proposition 1. Expected pro…ts in this case will be:
Expected pro…ts are maximized when  = 1 2 (  ¡   ) and   =   = 1 2 (  +   ). Expected pro…ts when  is chosen optimally will be  ¡ = (  +   ) ¡ 1 4 (  +   ) 2 ¡ 2 ¹  . Case (3): when AM is violated for agent A, it is clear that  should be chosen to be very negative so that the principal has unlimited authority over agent B. The solution to the principal's problem is given by case (1) of Proposition 1 for agent B and case (3) of Proposition 1 for agent A. This yields the following expected pro…t:
The threshold between cases (2) and (3), ¹   , is given by the value of   +   for which  ¡ =   . This implies that:
